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Abstract There is no agreement on how nanoethics
should proceed. In this article I focus on approaches
for discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology, which
is as of yet one of the most difficult and urging tasks
for nanoethics. I discuss and criticize two existing
approaches for discerning ethical issues in nanotech-
nology and propose a network approach as alterna-
tive. I discuss debates in nanoethics about the
desirable role of ethics in nanotechnological develop-
ment and about the newness of ethical issues in
nanotechnology. On basis of a critical analysis of both
debates, I formulate a number of desiderata for a
method for discerning ethical issues in nanotechnol-
ogy and argue that the network approach that my
colleagues and I have developed for ethical issues in
research and development networks is also appro-
priate in nanotechnology.
Keywords Ethical issues . Ethics .
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Introduction
Nanotechnology has caught a lot of ethical concern
and attention in the last few years. Several studies
have taken stock of potential ethical issues that are
raised by nanotechnology [4, 13, 22, 23, 26–28, 31,
33]. Such ethical issues include the environmental and
health opportunities and risks of nanotechnology, in
particular the potential risks of nanoparticles, privacy
and control threats raised by the use of nanodevices,
the possibilities for human disease treatment and
enhancement and the ethical consequences thereof,
and issues of equity, global justice and distribution of
benefits and risks, including ethical issues with
respect to patents and property rights.
The convergence in ethical aspects that are men-
tioned in various studies might lead to the impression
that the ethical issues raised by nanotechnology are
clear; what still need to be done is to analyze such
issues and to make decisions about them, but no
further efforts for discerning ethical issues are required.
I think this impression is wrong for two reasons. First,
nanoscience and nanotechnology are still in the very
early phases of development; even if we might expect
certain ethical issues to arise, it is difficult to predict all
possible ethical issues beforehand. Focusing on a list of
potential ethical issues based on today’s knowledge
might very well result in overlooking ethical issues in
the future. Second, the available overviews of ethical
issues in most cases are merely a taxonomy of types of
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ethical issues, like privacy or enhancement, rather than
a description of specific ethical issues raised by
specific scientific and technological developments.
The tacit premise is that once such specific issues arise
we will simply see them, without the need for a specific
approach or method. I think this view is mistaken and
based on rather context-free idea of what an ethical
issue is, as if an ethical issue is fully described by, for
example, the denominator ‘privacy.’ Obviously we
have reason to expect that nanotechnology will raise
privacy issues but that knowledge alone is not enough
to discern the concrete ethical issues as they arise
during the further development of nanotechnologies.
For these reasons, there is a need for methods for
discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology. One
might wonder what the proper subject of such method
is. The answer seems to be nanotechnology. Yet, this
answer might be too broad as well as too limited. It
might be too broad because nanotechnology is not
really one field of technology that raises one type of
ethical issues. Rather, there is a whole range of
nanotechnologies raising a whole range of ethical
issues. Still, it might be argued that one thing that all
nanotechnologies have in common is that they are new
and innovative and still in development. This charac-
teristic of nanotechnology makes it difficult to discern
the relevant ethical issues and seems to ask for a new
method or approach. So conceived, however, the label
‘nanotechnology’might be too limited. It is difficult to
discern ethical issues in the early phases of technolog-
ical development also in other technological domains,
and in these cases a similar method as for nanotech-
nology might be useful.1
Nanotechnology and other new technologies thus
pose challenges that require new approaches for
discerning ethical issues. In particular, I am thinking
of the challenge of developing a method or approach
that is (1) able to discern ethical issues while the
technology is still in its very early phases of develop-
ment and (2) to do so in such in way that these
reflections can inform the process of technological
development itself and (3) is able to identify specific
contextualized ethical issues raised by specific tech-
nological and scientific developments rather than to
describe the issues simply as privacy issues, safety
issues, enhancement issues and the like.
In this article, I will propose a method that is, I
claim, able to deal with these three challenges. This
method is based on a network approach for discerning
ethical issues in research and development (R&D)
that I developed together with Sjoerd Zwart, Michiel
Brumsen and Harald van Mil [34, 37]. In this article, I
will not explain the approach in all details because
this has been done in other publications. Rather, my
emphasis will be on arguing the adequacy of this
method against the background of the challenges,
existing approaches and debates in the ethics of
nanotechnology.
I start this article with a brief overview of two
existing approaches from the literature on ethics in
nanotechnology for discerning ethical issues. I then
turn to two relevant debates in the ethics of nanotech-
nology. These are the debate on the proper role of
ethics in nanotechnological R&D, and the debate on
whether nanotechnology gives rise to any new ethical
issues. On the basis of these discussions, I formulate a
number of desiderata for an alternative approach. I then
set out the network approach for discerning ethical
issues in research and design, as it has been proposed
by Zwart, Van de Poel, Van Mil and Brumsen [37] and
I show why this approach meets the mentioned
desiderata. I end with some critical remarks about
the limitations of this approach and considerations
that should be taken into account when employing it.
Current Approaches
Many of the early ethical concerns about nanotech-
nology had strong futuristic and science-fictional
overtones [4, 9, 24, 27]. Futuristic science fiction
stories about nanotechnology, both utopian and
dystopian, were told and these formed the basis for
ethical hopes, fears and concerns about nanotech-
nology. The grey goo scenario [7], in which out-of-
control and self-replicating nanodevices consume all
the matter in the world is a typical example, but also
many discussions about the possibility of human
enhancement fit this pattern. Nordmann [24] has
argued that such an approach is operating through
an ‘if … then …’ line of reasoning. If some futuristic
possibility or scenario will materialize then we are
1 Cf. the argument by Swierstra and Rip [30] that there might
be a need for a NEST-ethics (NEST refers to new and emerging
science and technology) even if there might not be a need for
nanoethics.
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confronted with a certain moral problem or with a
certain moral imperative. Typically the conditional if
is incredible but is skipped over to focus on the moral
issue or imperative. Nordmann calls such an approach
‘speculative nanoethics.’
Still, one might argue that this type of approach is
based on what Hans Jonas has called a ‘heuristics of
fear’ [16]. According to Jonas, in the age of technol-
ogy, the span of consequences of human action is
much wider—geographically, in time, and in magni-
tude (the possible destruction of mankind)—than
traditional ethics presupposes. We are therefore in
need of a new ethics: an ethics of the future. A first
duty of such an ethics is to visualize the long-term
effects of technological developments:
Now, where this world is not vouchsafed us on
its own—that is, by evil already present—it
becomes our duty to seek it out by an effort of
reason and imagination, so that it can instill in us
the fear whose guidance we need. That is the
case with the “ethics of the future” which we are
looking for, where that which is to be feared has
never yet happened and has perhaps no analogies
in past or present experience. Then the creatively
imagined malum has to take over the role of the
experienced malum, and this imagination does
not arise on its own but must be intentionally
induced. Therefore the anticipatory conjuring up
of this imagination becomes itself the first, as it
were introductory, duty of the ethics we are
speaking about ([16]: 27).
Many of the ethical worries, and of the promises,
with respect to nanotechnology are indeed based on
the use of imagination in a way very similar to what
Jonas argues for in this quotation. It could be argued
that such a use of imagination and the employment of
a heuristics of fear can be useful to know what is at
stake and might help to pay attention to such concerns
in the early phases of technological development, i.e.
in a phase that technology is still malleable.
Nevertheless, such an approach has a number of
very serious drawbacks.2 It is not unrealistic to expect
that many of the ethical issues that pop up as a
consequence of the employment of a heuristics of fear
on the basis of futuristic or science fiction stories do
never realize. This means that ethical concerns are
raised ‘unnecessarily’. Now, following Jonas, one
might argue that this is a price that is worth paying if
it helps to prevent a real future malum to happen.
However, the price seems to be quite high and it is
even not clear that this approach really helps against
preventing future malum. First, imagining, analyzing
and debating possible ethical concerns on the basis of
a heuristics of fear costs resources and time that may
well have been spend better. Second, it might lead to
fears and stop technological developments that are
actually quite promising for mankind. Third, once it
becomes clear that the initial concerns were misper-
ceived, it might lead to the conviction that no ethical
concerns are raised by nanotechnology at all, resulting
in a neglect of any ethical concerns about nanotech-
nology. Fourth, the heuristics of fear may well focus
on the wrong ethical issues and therefore not be able
to prevent future malum. It is not unlikely that the
attention for imaginative but far-reaching ethical
issues comes at the cost of attention for less imagi-
native, yet more realistic and often quite pervasive
ethical issues.
Most of the early ethical concerns about nano-
technology were not raised by professional ethicists.
Typically, more recent publications about ethical
issues in nanotechnology by ethicists and social
scientists employ a much more cautious approach to
discerning ethical issues. A typical example is the
stepwise methodological approach for discerning
ethical issues that has recently been proposed by
Brune et al. ([4]: 405). Their approach consists of
three steps:
1. Literature and web search on ethics and
nanotechnology
2. Evaluation of this material to see whether this
raises any new ethical issues, i.e. ethical issues
that cannot be dealt with the bounds of current
normative frameworks [11, 12]
3. Identifying possible gaps in the literature on ethics
and nanotechnology on the basis of a schematic
overview of nanotechnological research
Although this is an interesting and worthwhile
approach, at least two critical questions can be raised.
The first question is whether this approach does
enough to identify or discern the relevant ethical
issues. Of course, discerning ethical issues is a noto-
2 See also Nordmann [24] for a sustained criticism of
speculative nanoethics.
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riously difficult task, but I think that more can be
done than literature research and the identification of
gaps on basis of a schematic overview of nano-
technological research. The alternative approach that
is proposed in this article is based on closer inter-
action between nanotechnologists and ethicists in
discerning ethical issues in the early phases of
technological development.
The second question is whether the stepwise
approach does not place too much emphasis on the
newness of ethical issues. The implication of the
stepwise approach seems to be that ethical issues only
deserve attention if they are new. This touches on a
broader debate in the ethics of nanotechnology on
whether nanotechnology raises any new ethical
issues. I will discuss this debate in some detail below
and will argue that much of it is based on a wrong, or
at least irrelevant, notion of ‘newness.’ Before I do so,
I will first consider the debate on the desirable role of
ethics in nanotechnological R&D.
The Desirable Role of Ethics in Nanotechnological
R&D
In debates on the role of ethics in nanotechnology,
ethics has both been presented as a means to set limits
on the development of nanotechnology and nano-
technological R&D, as well as a means to ease devel-
opment of nanotechnology and to counter potential
public fear and lack of acceptance. I think that both
positions are seriously misconceived. Before explain-
ing why I think so and proposing an alternative, I will
first elaborate both positions by presenting the ideas of
typical proponents of both positions.
Pleas for a Moratorium
The first vision is perhaps most prominent in the
writings of computer scientist Bill Joy. In 2000, Joy
wrote an article in Wired with the title ‘Why the future
does not need us’ [17], which led to a lot of debate. In
this article Joy wrote:
I think it is no exaggeration to say we are on the
cusp of the further perfection of extreme evil, an
evil whose possibility spreads well beyond that
which weapons of mass destruction bequeathed
to the nation-states, on to a surprising and terrible
empowerment of extreme individuals.
Unfortunately, as with nuclear technology, it is
far easier to create destructive uses for nano-
technology than constructive ones. Nanotech-
nology has clear military and terrorist uses, and
you need not be suicidal to release a massively
destructive nanotechnological device—such
devices can be built to be selectively destructive,
affecting, for example, only a certain geograph-
ical area or a group of people who are geneti-
cally distinct.
An immediate consequence of the Faustian
bargain in obtaining the great power of nano-
technology is that we run a grave risk - the risk
that we might destroy the biosphere on which all
life depends. […]
The only realistic alternative I see is relinquish-
ment: to limit development of the technologies
that are too dangerous, by limiting our pursuit of
certain kinds of knowledge [17].
Joy thus argues for limits on the development of
nanotechnology, and other technologies, because these
technologies are very hazardous, especially when used
with bad intentions. He even argues for limits on
the production of knowledge, i.e. for a moratorium. In
verifying compliance with the limits that are to be set,
he sees a role for ethics:
Verifying compliance will… require that scientists
and engineers adopt a strong code of ethical
conduct, resembling the Hippocratic oath, and that
they have the courage to whistleblow as necessary,
even at high personal cost [17].
Also others have called for a moratorium on certain
nanotechnological developments on moral grounds.
The Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Con-
centration (ETC group), for example, has pleaded for a
moratorium on nanoparticles given the possible large
dangers and negative health effects of these:
At this stage, we know practically nothing about
the potential cumulative impact of human-made
nano-scale particles on human health and the
environment. Given the concerns raised over
nanoparticle contamination in living organisms,
governments should declare an immediate mora-
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torium on commercial production of new nano-
materials and launch a transparent global process
for evaluating the socio-economic, health and envi-
ronmental implications of the technology ([8]: 25).
It is interesting to note that the argument given by
Joy and by the ETC group for a moratorium closely
resembles Jonas’ arguments for a heuristics of fear.3
Promoting Nanotechnology
While, according to Joy, the role of ethics in nano-
technological developments is to set limits and to
contribute to verifying compliance with such limits,
others see a quite different role for ethics. This oppo-
site viewpoint is, for example, clearly visible in the
National Nanotechnological Initiative (NNI) of the
US. The foundational report for the NNI stated that:
The effect of nanotechnology on the health,
wealth, and lives of people could be at least as
significant as the combined influences of micro-
electronics, medical imaging, computer-aided
engineering, and man-made polymers developed
in this century (cited in [27]: 64).
Where Joy sees mainly dangers, the NNI stresses
the benefits of nanotechnology. Nevertheless, the NNI
sees an important role for ethics and ethical research.
In the original press release of the White House for
the NNI it was stated that:
Ethical, Legal, Societal Implications and Work-
force Education and Training efforts will be
undertaken to promote a new generation of skilled
workers in the multidisciplinary perspectives
necessary for rapid progress in nanotechnology
([36], my emphasis).
Typically, ethics is to contribute to rapid progress in
nanotechnology, which is again completely opposite to
Joy’s point of view. Ethics is to do so by improving the
communication from engineering and science to
society. As Schummer concludes on the basis of a
reading of the various relevant US policy texts on
nanotechnology and the NNI:
It seems that, for US policy makers, “societal
concerns” … means critical concerns by members
or groups of the society, which can be ethical,
legal, environmental, or other “appropriate” con-
cerns, and which should be addressed and
prevented by participatory models and education
to make the American society “prepared” for
nanotechnology. The broader concept, “societal
implications”, … includes, … the impact of ideas
about future nanotechnology on such concerns, but
excludes the impact of ideas in society on the
development of nanotechnology ([27]: 66, my
emphasis)
Comparing the Positions
Table 1 summarizes the positions taken in the debate.
At first sight, Joy and the NNI flatly contradict each
other on a number of relevant issues. However, a
closer look shows that there are a number of common
presuppositions in the reasoning of both Joy and the
NNI. One is that we, by and large, know the expected
effects of nanotechnology on society and that, on that
basis, the ethical assessment of nanotechnology is
clear. While Joy and the NNI make opposite ethical
assessments of nanotechnology, they both presuppose
that we already know enough to make such assess-
ments.4 Second, both see ethics mainly as a means for
communication. According to Joy, nanoscience listens
too little to social concerns, which calls for an
improvement of the communication from society to
science. The NNI wants to improve the communica-
tion from science to society in order to take away
allegedly unnecessary fears, and neglects the commu-
nication in the other direction. While Joy and the NNI
disagree about the direction of the needed communi-
cation, both conceive of ethics primarily as a means
for communication. Third, while both Joy and NNI
see a role for ethics in influencing, either by inhibiting
(Joy) or increasing (NNI), the pace of technological
3 This is true in particular for Joy’s argument. The call of the
ETC group is more modest. It calls for more knowledge
production about possible hazards before products are brought
onto the market, whereas Joy calls for a moratorium on
nanoscience. My criticism below is not directed against the
content of the argument of the ETC group, but rather to the way
the contribution of ethics to nanotechnology is implicitly
framed.
4 It is worth noting that the call for a moratorium by the ETC group
is in this respect somewhat different because it calls for more
knowledge production before we commercialize nanoproducts.
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development, the possibility that ethics might inform
the direction of technological development is
neglected.
All three presuppositions that are shared by Joy
and the NNI are problematic. First, there are good
reasons to suppose that we hardly know yet what
nanotechnology will bring for society; the ethical
issues are by no means clear yet. This is not to say
that we should neglect ethical concerns unless the
consequences are clear or should wait until the ethical
issues materialize. There are good reasons to try to
address ethical issues in the early stages of nano-
technological development. One reason is that if we
wait until the issues materialize, it might be too late to
deal with them or to redirect the path of technological
development. We should, however, try to keep an
open mind about what the ethical issues in nanotech-
nology are and should recognize that ethical judgment
about nanotechnologies is complex and debated.
Second, the reduction of ethics to communication
rests on a misconception of what ethics is about.
Ethics, as a philosophical discipline, aims at analyz-
ing ethical issues and in providing arguments, pro and
contra, certain positions. Even if one opposes the idea
that ethicists are to decide on what is morally
acceptable or not with respect to nanotechnology,
and I think that are good reasons to object to such a
role of ethical experts, the role of ethics is far richer
than just improving communication. Ethics can help
to clarify moral issues, to analyze them and to assess
arguments.
Third, it is not advisable to restrict the role of
ethics in nanotechnological development to just a
simply yes or no. Like in other domains, ethical issues
in nanotechnology are complex and cannot be answered
by a simply yes or no. Nanotechnology has potentially
great benefits to society and it seems unwise, if not
immoral, to simply forbid all nanotechnological devel-
opments because there may be great dangers. Un-
restricted development, without taking into account any
possible negative effects on society or potential hazards,
would also be unwise if not immoral. The way out of
this dilemma is to be sought in promoting specific
directions of technological R&D and/or in specific mea-
sures to address ethical issues. For example, the
knowledge that nanoparticlesmight be quite dangerous,
and might become a of new kind of asbestos, is at least
a strong prima facie moral reason to investigate the
health effects of nanoparticles before products that use
such particles are brought onto the market. I do not
want to suggest that all moral dilemmas around
nanotechnology can be easily solved in this way, on
the contrary, but a viable approach to the ethics of
nanotechnology should at least provide for the oppor-
tunity that ethics can inform the direction of nano-
technological R&D.
Does Nanotechnology Raise New Ethical Issues?
Although the ethics of nanotechnology, or nanoethics
as some prefer to call it, is still in its infancy, one









Development of nanotechnology is mainly
driven by economical and military considerations;
moral and social aspects are neglected, unless
enforced by society
Development of nanotechnology may
well be inhibited because people distrust
nanotechnology due to lack of communication
and lack of knowledge
Role of fear Useful, if not necessary, to discover what is
at stake and to trigger the right emotions for
addressing the ethical issues at stake
Misguiding the public and a possible cause
that inhibits nanotechnological development
Role of ethics Ethics should help to set, and verify, a moratorium
on nanotechnology
Ethics is to improve the communication from
science to society and so to promote the further
development of nanotechnology
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issue has already raised a lot of discussion, i.e.
whether any new ethical issues are raised by nano-
technology (e.g. [1, 10, 13, 15, 19]). What compli-
cates this debate is that different authors have used
different notions of ‘newness’ in this debate. At least
two different notions can be distinguished, one is that
an ethical issue is new if it is not raised by an existing
technology or not dealt with in another field of
applied ethics; another notion is that an ethical issue
is new if we (still) lack adequate normative standards
to deal with it.
Below, I will first discuss the different two mean-
ings of newness in the debate about the newness of
ethical issues in nanotechnology. I will then address
the question in what respects it might be relevant, or
not, to know whether ethical issues in nanotechnology
are new.
What is New?
The first notion of newness is based on the idea that
an ethical issue is new if it is not yet raised by another
technology or not yet covered by another field of
applied ethics. This notion of newness is, for
example, used in the following quote from Søren
Holm:
It is difficult to specify exactly what could make
an area of technology so special that it needs its
own ethics, but a minimal requirement must be
that it either raises ethical issues that are not
raised by other kinds of technologies, or that it
raises ethical issues of a different (i.e. larger)
magnitude than other technologies. Is this the
case for nanotechnology? ([15]: 1).
Holm’s answer is no. Grunwald [13] comes to a
similar conclusion:
The propagation of nano-ethics overlooks the
fact that many of the ethical questions raised by
nanotechnology are already known from other
contexts of ethical reflection. The ethics of
technology, bioethics, the ethics of medicine or
also the theoretical philosophy of technology
concern themselves with questions of sustain-
ability, of risk assessment, of the interface between
human beings and technology, especially between
living beings and technology. These questions are
in themselves not new… ([13]: 198).
Nevertheless, some ethical issues are new in
nanotechnology according to Grunwald:
Partially new, however, is their [i.e. of the
various ethical issues, IvdP] convergence in
nanotechnology. Analogous to the well-known
fact that nanosciences and nanotechnology are
fields in which the traditional borders between
physics, chemistry, biology, and the engineering
sciences are crossed, various traditional lines of
ethical reflection also converge in ethical ques-
tions in nanotechnology ([13]: 198).
Another issue that is often mentioned as being new
is human enhancement. Although the striving for
enhancement is as such not new, what is claimed to be
new is enhancement by technological means [10, 13].
As Grunwald remarks: ‘Technical enhancement of
human beings themselves—if this would be possible
at all—would in any case pose a series of new ethical
questions’ ([13]: 196).
New Normative Standards?
A second way in which ethical issues can be new is
that they require new normative standards. Several
authors have denied the need for new normative
standards for nanotechnology. Chris MacDonald, for
example, has stated that:
Ethical reflection on nanotech requires that we
apply ethical principles to new domains, but it
does not demand new principles. An example:
As nanoscience spawns developments in nano-
medicine, concerns arise related to experimenta-
tion on human subjects. These innovative
treatments will sometimes use novel methods of
delivery (e.g., drugs dispensed to tumors inside
engineered molecules such as fullerenes). Yet the
principles governing research will remain un-
changed. Researchers must continue focusing on
informed consent, risk minimization, and the
protection of vulnerable populations [19].
A similar argument has been made by Søren Holm:
While there is thus a great need for ethical
analysis of the many ethical issues raised by the
different developments in nanotechnology, there
is no need for a specific nanoethics. The toolbox
developed in applied ethics during the last
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35 years probably already contains the necessary
tools for the analysis of nanotechnology ([15]: 3).
Both authors thus argue that no new normative
standards, methods or concepts in ethics are required
to deal with the ethical issues in nanotechnology.
Their arguments, however, seems to presuppose a
rather deductive approach to applied ethics, in which
existing normative principles, concepts or methods
are applied to a new domain. Such a deductive
approach to applied ethics has been criticized by
several philosophers (e.g. [2, 20]).5 The deductive
approach has at least three shortcomings.
One problem of the deductive approach is what
theory to apply. In moral philosophy, no agreement
exists about normative standards. Different ethical
theories have been developed like utilitarianism and
other strands of consequentialism, deontology and
virtue ethics which might lead to conflicting recom-
mendations what to do in a concrete situation. In fact,
discussions about human enhancement through nano-
technology and other technologies have already given
rise to conflicting moral judgments (e.g. [10, 21]).
This is not to argue against the use of ethical theory as
such or to argue that moral disagreement is neces-
sarily a bad thing, it is to point out that the idea that
established ethical theories or standards are uncontro-
versial and can be applied to new moral problems as
they arise—i.e. the core of the deductive approach—
is too simplistic.
Two, the application of normative standards is
often not as straightforward as a deductive approach
suggests. In many situations, different normative
standards could be applied that yield inconclusive or
contradictory results. Often, we deal with situations in
which various normative standards conflict. Often
these conflicts are rather situation-specific and it may
be doubted whether any generally applicable algo-
rithms to solve such moral conflicts exist. A main
problem with the deductive approach is that it treats
moral problems as abstract philosophical problems to
be solved by the application of tools and normative
standards from moral philosophy and applied ethics.
However, actual moral problems always arise in a
specific context that partly defines the problem. For
example, what moral norms and values are conflicting,
and what kind of compromises or tradeoffs between
such norms and values are possible is context-
dependent and is not given by the mere fact that we
are confronted with, for example, a privacy issue. So,
even if both information and communication tech-
nology and nanotechnology raise privacy issues it
cannot be concluded a priori that these privacy issues
constitute the very same moral problem in both
domains, and that solutions that are adequate in one
domain can without problems be applied in the other
domain.
Third, theory development in ethics does not take
place, and cannot take place, completely independent
of concrete situations. To some extent, theory devel-
opment should be amendable to judgments about
particular situations and should be developed in order
to deal with concrete moral problems that arise in
existing and new practices. In fact, new technological
developments might problematize existing normative
standards or moral concepts. Developments in bio-
nanotechnology are for example expected to blur the
morally relevant distinction between treatment of
diseases and enhancement (cf. [4]: 418; [13]: 197).
Such technical developments thus require the rethink-
ing of certain morally relevant concepts and we
cannot simply apply existing (moral) concepts and
normative standards to deal with the ethical questions
concerning human enhancement by nanotechnology.
The deductive approach is thus problematic.
However, there might be other arguments why the
ethics of nanotechnology does not require new
normative standards. Such an alternative argument is
offered by Grunwald [4, 13]. According to Grunwald
[11, 12], ethical issues in technology do not require
ethical reflection if a normative framework exists that
meet certain conditions, i.e comprehensiveness (the
normative standards are sufficient to deal with the
problem under consideration), unambiguity, local
consistency, acceptance and compliance. If such
normative frameworks indeed exist and cover the
ethical issues raised by nanotechnology, there is no
need to develop new normative standards for nano-
technology. Grunwald [13] and Brune et al. [4]
discuss potential ethical issues in nanotechnology in
the light of existing normative frameworks. They
suggest that many ethical issues are already covered
5 For an approach that tries to justice to normative principles
and ethical theories without applying a deductive approach, see
for example van de Poel and Royakkers [35].
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by existing normative frameworks, although some are
not. Regretfully, their conclusions are not always
entirely clear. For example, with respect to nano-
particles, they conclude that the type of ethical issues
that are raised by nanoparticles are not new and are in
fact already known from other field of risks ([4]: 409;
[13]: 192). This suggests that a normative framework
is already available.6 In the meantime, they say that
ethical reflection could take place on questions like
‘Which role do the—doubtlessly considerable—
opportunities of nano-particles based products play
in considerations …? Upon which criteria could
benefits and hazards be weighed against each other
when the benefits are (relatively) concrete, but the
hazards are hypothetical?’ ([4]: 408; see also [13]:
191). Raising this kind of questions suggests that we
still lack a normative framework to make all relevant
decisions about nanoparticles.
Apart from the question whether ethical issues in
nanotechnology are covered by existing normative
frameworks, doubts may be raised about how likely it
is that such existing normative frameworks meet all
conditions mentioned by Grunwald. It is true, for
example, that regulative frameworks exist for the
acceptance of technical risks, consisting for example
of legal requirements and technical codes and stan-
dards. In many cases it may be doubted, however,
whether these frameworks are accepted by all who are
potentially affected by such risks, while such accep-
tance is one of the conditions that Grunwald for-
mulates for the existence of a normative, instead of
only a regulative, framework.
Is It Relevant Whether Nanotechnology Raises New
Ethical Issues or Not?
One reason why the discussion about the newness of
ethical issues in nanotechnology has come up is that
some authors have argued for the need of a new field
of nanoethics (e.g. [1, 23]). Arguments against the
newness of ethical issues in nanotechnology are
supposed to be a knock-down argument against a
separate field of nanoethics (cf. the earlier quote from
Holm). However, there may be other reasons—apart
from the alleged newness of ethical issues in
nanotechnology—for establishing a separate field of
nanoethics, for example because nanotechnology is
now very visible and having a separate field of
nanoethics may make the ethical issues also more
visible and might provide a platform to discuss ethical
issues with nanoscientists [1]. On the other hand,
even if nanotechnology would raise new ethical issues
there may be reasons not to have a separate field of
nanoethics, or at least not to separate it too much from
existing fields of applied ethics or from moral
philosophy, for example, in order to prevent that
insights from such other fields are overlooked in
nanoethics,7 or to prevent that ethical issues in
nanotechnology are too much separated from related
ethical issues in other fields [13].
The newness of ethical issues in nanotechnology
might after all not be that relevant. There is in fact a
danger in focusing so strongly on the newness of
ethical issues, i.e. that attention is drawn away from
ethical issues that are maybe not entirely new but
nevertheless pressing from a social point of view.
Several authors have indeed stressed that ethical
issues should be addressed even if they are not
genuinely new (e.g. [15, 31]). The danger is, however,
not only that ethical issues which are not genuinely
new are not addressed, but also that such ethical
issues are not discerned in the first place. One
common presupposition in the whole debate on the
newness of ethical issues in nanotechnology seems to
be that we already know what the ethical issues are or
will be. I think that there are good reasons to suppose
that many important ethical issues will become clear
as nanotechnology further develops and that some of
the ethical issues that will arise depend on choices
made in nanotechnological R&D (cf. [31]: 51). What
is needed then is an approach that makes it possible to
discern and analyze ethical issues as nanotechnology
develops.
6 Another reading would be that this statement only deals with
newness in the first sense that I discussed above.
7 Ironically, this lack of awareness of insights from applied
ethics or moral philosophy also seems apparent in some
arguments against the newness of ethical issues in nanotech-
nology. This is for example the case for the apparent lack of
awareness of well-known objections against the deductive
model.
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An Alternative Approach
On the basis of the discussion of the two debates
above, desiderata for an approach to discerning
ethical issues in nanotechnology that substantially
improves upon existing approaches can be formulated.
First, it is desirable to develop an approach that is able
to discern ethical issues in nanotechnology as they
emerge during the further development of nanotech-
nologies and that does not presume that ethical issues
are given or clear-cut. Second, such an approach
should make it possible to use ethical insights to
inform and steer nanotechnological R&D and should
not say simply yes or no to certain nanotechnological
developments. Finally, such an approach should deal
with ethical issues in their real-world context rather
than taking them as abstract ethical issues that can be
solved by applying existing ethical concepts and
theories.8
I now turn to the description of an approach for
discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology that
addresses these desiderata. The approach itself is not
peculiar to nanotechnology and has been described by
me and my colleagues elsewhere [37]. The emphasis
here is therefore not on a description of the approach
itself but on its applicability to ethical issues in
nanotechnology.
Network Approach for Discerning Ethical Issues
The network approach for discerning ethical issues
has been developed to discern ethical issues in
technological R&D. R&D settings are characterized
by two features that complicate the discerning of
ethical issues [37].
One is that there is usually a distance in time, place
and involved parties between the R&D activities and
the eventual application of the technology that gives
rise to social effects and ethical concerns. Nano-
technology is subject to the so-called Collingridge
dilemma [6]: at the phase that we can still direct a
certain technology, the ethical and social issues raised
by that technology are not yet known or clear, while
at the stage that these issues become clear or more
well-defined, the possibilities of steering the tech-
nological development have declined considerably
because the technology is more embedded in society.
The second feature that complicates the discerning
of ethical issues is that usually various parties are
involved in R&D with different interests, visions, and
degrees of power. The eventual R&D trajectory and
the ethical issues it raises will therefore be the result
of the actions of these various actors, and is not
determined by one actor.
The network approach we have developed deals
with these two complicating factors by using the
involved actors and potential stakeholders as an entry
for discerning ethical issues while doing justice to the
different perspectives and perceptions of the actors
involved and the stakeholders. It does so, for example,
through interviews and brain-storming sessions with
the relevant actors and stakeholders (see [37] for a
more detailed description).
Network approaches have become popular in a
number of descriptive disciplines like policy science
and science and technology studies over the last
decades (e.g. [5, 14, 18, 25]). Such approaches have
been introduced to take account of the fact that
activities like technological development and policy
making are not controlled by one actor but by a range
of actors who are mutually dependent. It is, for
example, generally recognized that technological
R&D takes place in networks of actors like universi-
ties, research institutes, corporations, government
agencies, and prospective users. While current net-
work approaches account for that, our contribution
has been to adapt such an approach to the discernment
of ethical issues. What is especially important here is
to realize that different actors in an R&D network
have different interests, resources, knowledge and
power, as well as different problem definitions and
agendas. ‘Problem definition’ refers to ‘the different
actor perceptions or interpretations of what is the
8 On basis of the earlier discussion, one might want to add
a fourth criterion: the method should conceive of ethics not
only as means for communication but also as an analytical
discipline. The reason I have not included this desideratum
is that it refers to ethical analysis while I restrict myself
here to an approach for discerning ethical issues. Neverthe-
less, the network approach outlined in this article certainly
allows for a broader conception of ethics than just a means of
communication. For more specific proposals how to combine
ethical analysis with a network approach, see van de Poel et al.
[34].
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central issue in the network’ ([37]: 671) ‘Agendas’ are
‘coherent sets of goals or ends, which these actors
want to achieve.’ ([37]: 671). The agendas of various
actors may be conflicting.
Actors in a network have different problem defini-
tion and agendas because they have different interests,
resources, knowledge and power, as well as different
belief and value systems. A belief or value system is a
more or less coherent set of beliefs and values held by
an actor. It consists in beliefs about concrete facts and
with respect to specific normative issues, and in
principles and background theories that an actor uses
in arriving at, or justifying, his or her beliefs and values.
The main idea of the network approach for
discerning ethical issues in R&D is that it is very
helpful to identify differences between the problem
definitions, agendas and belief and value systems of
the actors in an R&D network, and the dynamics of
the network under consideration in order to discern
ethical issues. Two examples from a project where we
applied the network approach to discern ethical issues
might illustrate this idea. This project concerned the
development of a new technology for treating sewage.
One of the things that we discovered in this project
by applying a network approach is that different
actors made different estimates of the likelihood that
the new treatment reactor would meet the primary, i.e.
legally mandatory, treatment requirements. The pro-
jected users of the technology were more pessimistic
in this respect than the researchers. This factual
disagreement can be morally relevant for a number
of reasons. One is that it might indicate insincerity on
the side of the researchers; they may be more
optimistic than warranted or may present the chances
of meeting the requirements as larger than they
actually believe to be true. This was, however, not
the case in the specific project we researched. The
disagreement might also be morally relevant because
it can be an indication that public funds are not well
spent: if the chances of meeting the primary require-
ments are dim, it is questionable whether such a
project should receive public funding. Again, in our
assessment, this was not the case here. The difference
in estimate may also be relevant because if the
primary requirements are not met it might create
environmental and health problems. This is certainly
a reason to pay enough attention to meeting the
requirements.
Another issue on which different actors had
different opinions related to so-called secondary
emissions. These are emissions that are not yet
regulated by the law, but are nevertheless relevant in
terms of environmental pollution or health. Typically,
sewage treatment plants remove, for example, patho-
genic bacteria or heavy metals from sewage, while the
required levels of treatment for such substances and
organisms are not always laid down in the law. When
a new reactor is developed, it might well be the case
that it removes less secondary emissions than tradi-
tional reactors especially if the retention time of the
sewage in the reactor is shorter. We found that there
was an interesting, yet worrying, disagreement in the
R&D network about who should take care of inves-
tigating and possibly preventing higher secondary
emissions. Most researchers thought that this should
be done during the use phase, while most prospective
users thought this issue should be addressed during
the research phase. This situation may give raise to
what is known as the problem of many hands [3, 32]:
in situations in which a multiplicity of actors is
involved it might be unclear who is responsible for
what and for some issues it might well be the case
that nobody assumes responsibility. It is not difficult
to think of analogous situations in nanotechnology:
who, for example, is—or should be—responsible for
investigating the potential toxicity of nanoparticles?9
The Applicability of the Network Approach
to Nanotechnology
Although the network approach is not specifically
developed for nanotechnology, for a number of
reasons, the approach is especially appropriate for
discerning ethical issues in nanotechnology. I will
focus here on the earlier mentioned desiderata.
First, ethical issues in nanotechnology are still
unknown or in flux. To an important extent, this is
due to the fact that nanotechnology is still in an early
phase of development and to the distance between the
research that is now being done in the scientific
laboratories and the eventual applications. The net-
9 For a discussion of some of the issues involved here, see
Shrader-Frechette [29].
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work approach has been specifically developed to
deal with these difficulties. It uses the researchers and
the networks in which they participate, including the
other relevant parties in these networks, as entry for
discerning ethical issues. What is important is that
ethical issues often do not arise at the level of
individual researchers and engineers, but at more
collective levels. The two examples from the devel-
opment of a sewage treatment reactor illustrate this.
For example, the problem that nobody assumes
responsibility for investigating secondary emissions
is only visible at the collective level at not at the level
of individuals in isolation. The network approach is
thus especially appropriate to discern ethical issues
that arise at more collective levels.
Second, the network approach can be applied
already at the early stages of technological develop-
ment and addresses the researchers involved in nano-
technology. It can therefore generate insights that
immediately influence R&D and research and design
decisions. In the earlier mentioned case of the sewage
treatment reactor, the articulation of some ethical
issues in fact has influenced the formulation of further
technical research proposals.10
Third, the network approach discerns ethical issues
in their real-world context. The people involved in
R&D and the relevant networks are used as entry for
discerning ethical issues. This is not to say that issues
are only seen as ethical if the actors themselves
recognize them as such, the ethicist him- or herself
has the room to articulate certain ethical issues even if
the actors themselves do not recognize them as such.
However, this articulation takes into account the
empirical facts of the situation and is not just based
on a heuristics of fear or an analogy with other tech-
nical domains or abstract philosophical considerations
alone.
Limitations and Challenges
A major strength of the network approach is that is
takes researchers and engineers, and the networks in
which they participate, as entry for discerning ethical
issues. Nevertheless, this characteristic also leads to a
number of limitations and challenges for the network
approach.
A first issue is that the network approach requires
close collaboration with the people involved in nano-
technological R&D and requires a certain amount of
mutual trust to be successful.11 A danger of this is that
it might hamper the independence of the ethicists
involved. They might feel compelled to be not too
critical towards the nanotechnological researchers in
order to successfully apply the approach. Although
this is a real issue, it should not be overstated. I think
this issue can be dealt with by a combination of
personal skills and institutional safeguards. It requires
skills to maintain a relation with the researchers that is
based on trust, while it at the same time it leaves room
to be mutually critical—it is important to realize that
also the nanotechnological researchers should have
the room to criticize the ethicists. Still, this type of
interpersonal relation is quite common in science; also
peers within the same scientific area have relations
based on a combination of trust and criticism, and
cooperation and competition. In addition, it would be
desirable to establish institutional safeguards that
protect the independence of the ethicists. Conversely,
it should be recognized that for nanotechnological
researchers there are also important stakes. Critical
reporting about some nanotechnological development
might hamper the funding of nanotechnological
research or might make potential users more cautious.
This places a certain responsibility on the shoulders
of ethicists of being not too eager to report ethical
worries if these are far-fetched or unrealistic. It also
requires, I think, an institutional safeguard that gives
nanotechnological researchers the possibility to react
to claims made by ethicists or to complain about
unwarranted claims.
A second issue is that the application of a network
approach, especially if it focuses strongly on the
researchers involved, might neglect certain perspec-
tives on the relevant ethical issues, in particular
the perspectives of those not directly involved but
10 Personal communication Merle de Kreuk
11 It also requires that the ethicists have some knowledge of
nanotechnology, so that they understand what they are talking
about and are able to identify ethical issues somewhat
independent from the nanoscientists and engineers. This
requirement is, however, not specific for a network approach
but applies to any sensible approach to nanoethics.
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nevertheless affected by the technology. There are,
however, various possibilities to avoid this. In apply-
ing the network approach, it is perfectly possibly to
involve all kinds of relevant stakeholders, like, for
example, researchers that are not part of the relevant
R&D network but work in a neighboring area.
Third, a network approach may fall short in dealing
with broader ethical issues that transcend the bound-
aries of R&D networks. One such issue is whether
certain nanotechnological R&D should be done at all
or whether certain applications should be banned. For
such decisions, insights of what is going on in R&D
networks and the type of ethical issues this raises is
still relevant but the broader ethical issue transcends
the boundaries of actual R&D networks. This is also
for example true for global justice considerations with
respect to nanotechnology. Again, insights in what is
going on in R&D networks can be quite relevant here
and sometimes R&D decisions can influence whether
global justice issues arise or not, for example by
choosing one R&D trajectory over another.12 Still, it
can be argued that some of the issues involved are to
be addressed at other locations than the R&D
networks. One way of dealing which such issues
might be to look at nested networks. R&D networks
are embedded in other networks; this embedding is
not morally neutral and may influence for example
the way certain technologies that have been devel-
oped in R&D networks are applied.13 So an extended
network approach might be quite useful here.
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